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Though young men used to be told never to apologize and never to explain, I think that at my age lowe the Section of Paediatrics an explanation of how I came to have the effrontery to offer a lecture on ethics as my Presidential Address, and also an apology in advance if what I say offends against their personal convictions or fails to rise to the level that the subject deserves. It was in fact your Committee who felt that my subject is one that should in some way be aired or debated in this session, following the traumata "of the 1980 Reith Lectures and the crises of the Arthur and Alexander cases in particular (Kennedy 1981, Brahams ] 98], British Medical Journal ]981); but I bear the responsibility for taking the onus on myself. I am not, of course, saying 'do as I tell you' let alone 'do as I do', but giving what I believe is now called a position paper which I hope will be useful as a starting point for reflection and debate. If you find my treatment of the subject somewhat cavalier, I would remind you that solemnity is not the same as being serious, whatever puritans may feel, and to quote, not for the last time, from Sir Thomas Browne's 'Religio Medici', which I have found so useful in guiding me in my present task: 'my best hope would be to laugh the time into goodness', rather than to preach a kind of sermon. If I have to admit to a total lack of training in theology, metaphysics, philosophy and other disciplines which might be thought germane to my subject, I would remind you how useless Dr Faustus found such academic studies as a guide to real life, declaring himself 'no wiser than before' (so klug als wie zuvor) at the end of his studies, and that they were stigmatized by Paul the Apostle as 'philosophy and vain deceits'.
What I hope to do is, at the least, to put in some kind of perspective the charges which have been levelled against us as a profession: of playing God, serving science or Mammon instead of our patients, or imposing our own essentially middle class (and not necessarily the worse for that) values upon the people whom we try to serve. The first question, therefore, which must be answered is whether there actually is an ethical crisis in medical practice at this time, or whether the profession has merely lost its nerve in the face of outside criticism such as that voiced by Mr Ian Kennedy (/98]) . Perhaps, after all, the Emperor is fully dressed as he always thought he was and Mr Kennedy's X-ray eyes are unique to him; but even if that is true, to recover our collective nerve we probably need to re-examine the implicit moral assumptions that underlie those of our decisions that are not purely technical. Such an examination is, as the learned Richard Hooker put it, 'often more necessary than pleasant'. To give you the whole quotation: 'In these matters it cometh no otherwise to pass, that in sundry the works both of art and of nature, that which hath the greatest force in the things we see is itself notwithstanding often times unseen: the stateliness of houses, the goodliness oC trees when we behold them, delighteth the eye; but that foundation which bears up the one, that root which ministereth unto the other nourishment and life, is in the bosom of the earth concealed; and if there be occasion at any time to search into it, such labour is more necessary than pleasant' (Ecclesiastical Polity).
St Augustine was surely right in pointing out that faith precedes reason: a percept reinforced by Godel's demonstration that those who enter an argument without an assumption will sooner or later run into a contradiction. It behoves us therefore, now that our moral tower is felt to be tilting by both those who live in it and those who look at it, to examine its foundations as to their soundness; and these foundations lie in our beliefs expressed as value judgments. Man gets these value judgments either from his religion, whose tenets derive from revelation, e.g. the Bible, the Koran etc., or from his own constitution: Kant's 'moralische Gesetz', planted in the soul and made manifest by moral intuition; described, as Winnicott might have preferred it, by Sir Thomas Browne as 'an inbred loyalty to virtue'. But to be effective in regulating our relations with others, it is needful that some assumptions should be shared or at least understood by those with whom we deal -which in the case of our profession means patients or parents' responsible for patients; and to share them in this way we need to know what they are and to be able to state them explicitly. This is difficult in an age of no faith and in what could be called, gracelessly, a multicultural society. Fortunately, however, most medical practitioners share some basic tenets with most of their clients -a kind of lowest common denominator of belief.
Our present moral dilemma stems, like that of Shaw's doctor in the play of that name, from the fact that, thanks to science and its application through technology, we can now 'do something' whereas our Victorian forebears with only very limited therapeutic resources could only 'stand there'; for moral responsibility is, to some degree, a function of power. Baldwin called the exercise of power without responsibility 'the prerogative of the harlot' (he was referring not inaptly to the press); and it behoves us to use our power with a proper sense of responsibility. We cannot assume that the power to postpone death is necessarily one that our patients would wish us in all circumstances to use, as in the strange case of Mr Valdemar, for as Sir Thomas Browne states, 'one comfort left: that though it be in the power of the weakest arm to take away life, it is not in that of the strongest to deprive us of death'. And though written ironically, not didactically, there is also much sense in Arthur Clough's much quoted lines: 'thou shalt not kill -nor needst thou strive officiously to keep alive'. It depends on' what for~to complete an otherwise truncated life, or to advertise the competence and devotion of the hospital service. But certainly we cannot regard the extension of any kind of life at all costs (to the patient and to the NHS) as a categorical imperative and non-contingent. It remains true that we can only cure sometimes though we can relieve often and comfort always. This problem is compounded for the paediatrician by the fact that the life in his hands is to some extent only potential; and that whereas to give an adult some years more of a life that has reached its final shape and style can only be regarded as good, such a gift may be pointless for an infant if he or she cannot hope ever to reach maturity. Of course, in most cases his parents will want him to live on as long as he can in relative comfort; but while parents have the duty to keep going for the sake of the children, it cannot be said that children owe this to their parents; and indeed parents themselves often secretly or even openly hope for the death of a badly deformed or damaged newborn baby rather than that he or she should be preserved to become a burden to the family and the State. Aristotle put very well the common sense, no-nonsense view which many of us feel should guide our conduct in such circumstances: 'as to the exposure of children, let there be a law that no deformed child shall live: however let no child be exposed because of excess population, but when couples have too many children let abortions be procured before sense and life have begun': To quote Sir Thomas Browne yet again, a fetus has only a 'dull kind of being, not yet privileged with life' at the beginning of a pregnancy, but at the end is 'not without life sense and reason, awaiting only the opportunity of objects'. However, as another Browne put it to me (he was Professor of Obstetrics at Hammersmith), 'you may be in favour of abortion on demand; I am in favour of infanticide because you will have to do it!' There must, however, in a life of whatever duration, come a time when it is true to say, as of King Lear, 'he hates him who would upon the rack of this tough world stretch him out longer'; and we need to be able to recognize when innate vitality has been attenuated to this point. Professor A G M Campbell (1982) of Aberdeen tells us that in his neonatal practice nearly 50% of deaths (and we are more likely to die in the first week of our lives than in any other except the last!) are the immediate consequence of a decision to withhold or withdraw what would be pointless life support; however, the switching off of the ventilator in these circumstances should perhaps be attended by an appropriate ceremony to express the feelings of those involved about a death that, however wished for, is not necessarily unmourned and might otherwise be the occasion of guilt or remorse. It is worth reflecting on here that while we all agonize over every death, we show by and large remarkably little awareness of the enormity of conniving at that still more momentous event, a conception -yet overpopulation, the result of too high a birth rate and the increase in life expectancy (the doubling of which doubles the population), is perhaps the world's greatest problem in our time and may yet destroy us all.
Thus death -or the preservation of pointless life -is not the whole problem, and of course we are seldom in a position in neonatal practice, as our colleagues in adult surgery and medicine usually are, to know what the outcome will be if we hang on. Nor is the patient's the only interest that we must consider: there are also the needs and views of parents; unexpressed as well as expressed, our own needs as doctors, as well as those of nursing and other colleagues, often more deeply involved with the baby as a person than ourselves; the law of the land, which in a democratic country should represent the consensus of views within the community that, after all, pays for the service; even those of the Community Health Councilor their equivalent, and the press, as representing current opinion (which may be in advance of the law). Our little tragedy concerns not only Prince Hamlet or the King and Queen and their advisors, as John Jones, Oxford's latest Professor of Poetry once expressed it to me, but the whole 'state of Denmark', since what happens affects us all and we all have to live with it ever afterwards; becoming, in Middleton's words in 'The Changeling', 'our deeds creatures'. The corollary is that if the State (for perhaps good reasons, since we might all prefer to live under a regime that, for instance, assisted in the nurture of babies with Down's syndrome rather than their deliberate destruction, as happened in Nazi Germany): if the State insists, against the wishes of the parents, that a particular baby be kept artificially alive, the community should be morally obliged to share in the cost of its upbringing and to relieve the parents of a major part of their financial burden. I should like to add in this context that many of the unfortunate consequences of parents having to prove negligence in order to reimburse themselves for the cost of rearing a handicapped child would be mitigated were the State to assume the duty of providing what support is required (as it already, up to a point, does), in which case it would presumably also become the appropriate beneficiary of any action for damages. Such an arrangement might not be to the liking of lawyers, but it would in practice benefit both doctors and their patients and ensure that actions were brought for the right reasons and by bodies powerful enough to fight them out.
We may feel that in such circumstances the law is an ass; but perhaps it has to be, to bear its particular burden. Dr Leonard Arthur will, I hope forgive me if I add that it was a kind of compound quixotry on his part to turn his lance upon Rosinante, bearing as she did on her back the common man -Sancho Panza -with all his quirks, prejudices, litigiousness and what might be called moral common sense, rather than upon the windmill symbolizing the problems of disease and death.
So much for the law; and as for the third of the noble professions, religion, while it can provide welcome guidance and comfort to the believer, it can, when it turns to casuistry, either make a fool of itself, as apostrophied in Pascal's letters to a provincial, or even mislead us into doing wrong; 'tantum religio potuit suadere rna/arum' in the damning line of Lucretius commenting on the sacrifice of Iphigeny. In any case we cannot share. our hundred religions as we might our one sauce.
Thus though we might all agree that our primary preoccupation should be the good of the patient -which will also be the good of his physician -if we ask what that good might be, we could get various answers. To list but a few, the stoic might reply 'never to be born, or if born to die young'; the Epicurean, 'to enjoy life' (or even the Californian version -'have fun'); the orthodox Catholic, 'to save one's soul'; the utilitarian, 'to add to the sum of human happiness'; the disciple of Nietsche, 'to become what you are' ('der werden, der du bist'); the puritan, 'to help establish the kingdom of God on earth'; the psychobiologist, 'to pass on one's supposedly selfish genes'; and the Jew, most comprehensively and perspicaciously of all from a physician's point of view (as I see it), 'to build a whole world of one's own in space-time'. To quote the Sanhedrin: 'Therefore only a single human being [Adam] was created in the world, to teach that if any person has caused a single soul of Israel to perish, scripture regards him as if he had caused an entire world to perish -and if any human being saves a single soul of Israel, scripture regards him as if he had saved the entire world'.,
It is difficult to find much in common between these possible views of life: but all of them assume a modicum of independence and some ability to relate to other people, without which humanity, as we understand it, does not exist; and perhaps these should be our minimum criteria for a life that is worth preserving. Death is not the last enemy of every patient, but a friend to many; and at the end some of us would prefer to have a Doctor Jekyll.at our bedside -as depicted in Sir Luke Fildes famous Victorian painting now in the Tate Gallery -knowing, as Jefferson expressed it, 'the real limits of his art' and that 'when the state of his patient gets beyond these, his office is to be a watchful but quiet spectator of the operations of nature', than a Mr Hyde -the medical profession militant -who in his war against disease, fought over the patient's territory, may leave scorched earth behind him. Sometimes they serve better who only sit and wait, obeying the injunction 'don't just do something; stand there'.
There remains, in this consideration of life and death matters, the question of the so-called 'triage': when to sacrifice one patient for another ifresources are inadequate for both. I shall return obliquely to this question later in considering the relation between the doctor and the State: in individual instances the decision is usually an obvious one when it confronts us in the nursery, though less straightforward for an administrator.
To sum up: When a tired and harassed resident has to make, without warning or opportunity for reflection or consultation, a decision that may be irrevocable, for life or death, he must take into proper account the law of the land, which he disobeys at his peril, and the religious belief of all concerned; but in the end the decision is his own and he must be prepared to stand by it. It is our shame as teachers that we do not always prepare him adequately for it, or support him adequately in it; yet in the last analysis, to turn once more to Sir Thomas Browne, 'there is as much divinity in Galen (i.e. the practice of the physician) his book (De Usu Partus) as in Suarez metaphysics'. Perhaps we have allowed an ambience to arise in which the decision to preserve life is easier than to let it go (and therefore more likely to be made); and, for this again, consultants bear the main responsibility. However it would seem that in practice we are trusted and by and large deserve to be; but it is worthy of remark that it is essentially wrong that parents should be expected to acquiesce in decisions made by a physician whom they may never have met. Perhaps there should be an introduction in the antenatal clinic just in case; or perhaps the public does pay the profession the great compliment of taking its good will and good sense largely on trust, in which case we must endeavour to deserve it by undertaking seriously the task of working out for ourselves the principles that inform our necessarily contingent practice.
This leads, me on to examine in more depth the triangular relationship between a physician, his child patient, and his clients -the child's parents or guardian. In most cases at least two of these parties will be agreed on what is the 'good of the child' towards which they are jointly working; but we are all too familiar with situations in which they are in conflict; and when doctor and clients come into conflict it is his patient -their child -who is likely to suffer. A child is not, as William Morris pointed out, when it was necessary to do so, his parents' property: to quote Fibran's 'The Prophet': 'and he said: your children are not your children; they are the sons and daughters of life's longing for itself; they come through you, but not from you, and though they are with you, yet they belong not to you; you are the bows from which your children as living arrows are sent forth'. Thus their rights as parents are conferred so that they can fulfil their duties as parents and are legitimately forfeited when the latter are neglected. But who can define a good, or even an adequate parent? So many of us as parents spend years, as Winnicott pointed out, providing the therapy needed to make up for our previous failure; and yet the successful rearing of a child may also in the long run derive from his parents' mended failures, provided that the latter were not too catastrophic and the mending is done in time. In the long run, as Freud is said to have put it, this success is gauged by his adult ability to work and to love: to hold down a job and to sustain a marriage. However, the paediatrician is at an advantage over, for instance, social workers in making judgments in this difficult area since, because children live in the psychesoma, their physiological state is often the best indication of their parents' adequacy. If they have been injured. by those who should protect them; if they cannot thrive in the hands of those who should nourish them, yet can elsewhere; if they develop physical symptoms that are known to express emotionally intolerable conflicts, this will become apparent and appropriate action will have to be taken -especially if the law has been broken. And just as the 'real' neighbour is the one who acts as one, so the 'real' parent is the one who meets a child's basic needs. This is easier for 'natural' parents, with natural affinities, but it is clear that a good two-parent adoptive family is better for a child than many an inadequate though natural one-parent family, so long as the need for continuity is-respected. In such transitions love may be best expressed, as by the real mother in the judgment of Solomon, by letting the child go.
Our problem is to reconcile our professional contract with our contract with our client and our professional duty to our patient. In this connection something needs to be said about organ donation by children, even if this only involves expendable tissue like bone marrow. A child's tissues and organs are not the property of his family, and his physician should protect him from being used as a donor when he cannot give permission or when he is subjected to intolerable psychological and moral pressure to make himself available as one. On the other hand, the physician needs to bear in mind that at some future date the child may come to wish that he had done so; and in this case the guilt must not be his and the opportunity should not necessarily be closed at the time.
It could be said that in making decisions that may involve the separation of a child from his family, the physician may in reality be acting in the best interest of the parents both biologically and morally, even though they may not see it to be so; and that one of the duties of a professional adviser with his disinterested concern for his client is to see, more clearly than the client himself, what his long-term interests, even sub sped aeteritatis, involve. Thus in the case of an accountant it would be wrong from his client's point of view to help 'fiddle the books' in order to get him out of acute financial difficulties, since this would be acting against the real long-term interests of both of them, even if bankruptcy were to be the immediate penalty. In the same way a physician should not connive at actions which his client might repent of in court or at the last judgment.
However, the paediatrician also needs to remember that he is a doctor and should not subscribe to the fallacy that his role is pastoral any more than it is that of a scientist -as Professor Dornhurst (1967) has reminded us. Our principal task is to offer good advice based on our professional knowledge, and most parents know better than we do how to bring up their children.
I have already noted that, outside the triangle of doctor, patient and client, there is another triangle whose corners represent the profession, the family and the State: the last not only because it guarantees the system of insurance that pays for our NHS, not only because by law it sets boundaries to our freedom of decision and defines our duties, but also because it has a real interest in the outcome of our endeavours, which necessarily have a major influence for the wellbeing of future generations living together. A duty which it does not lay down, but which it has a right to expect us to perform, is to keep it informed from our special and privileged vantage point of how the body politic is faring in its reproductive function of providing a 'facilitating environment' (Dr Winnicott's phrase) for its future citizens. This is the duty which we have in the past somewhat neglected -partly because our channel of communication with government has not been adequately defined. But we should not remain silent while doing our best to ameliorate the effects on health of our present policy if we become aware that it is unnecessarily or corrigibly allowing our children to grow up less healthy than they might be. It is good to mend a broken limb; but it is not good enough if we neglect to point out that the accident causing it was the consequence, for instance, of a neglect to regulate the traffic sensibly outside a school. Only we and the parents are in a position, so to speak, to put our hands in the wound -and pain and handicap cannot be felt as statistics. Sir Douglas Black (1981) is only the latest figure of authority amongst us to point out the disturbing relationship in the UK between morbidity and social class; and these statistics are reinforced by others that show a relationship between childhood mortality and mortality in the survivors of the same cohort in later years -suggesting, incidentally, that the survival of the fittest is a somewhat pyrrhic victory for them since it leaves them less fit than they might have been if not challenged by adverse circumstances.
It is no good our demanding increased resources for ameliorative and curative medicine if this results in their diversion from areas concerned with the genesis of disease, but that is not to proclaim myself a statist (one who labours to contrive a commonwealth without poverty; cf. 'Religio Medici') since, as Gilbert White once pointed out when speaking of the substitution of tallow candles for rush lights by the indigent, poverty will always be with us because some of us will always be improvident -sometimes spending what resources are available on the very things that do the damage, such as alcohol and tobacco. Perhaps today the opium of the people is opium! Physicians ought to be the servants of their patients and clients, but like Jeeves or Figaro they may need to take a paternal line in the interests of their masters. However, no man can serve two masters; and we may occasionally run into difficulties when the interest of an individual conflicts with that of the community -as was thought might be the case with whooping cough vaccination. Here the duty of the physician is to make the situation clear both to his clients and to his paymaster, leaving the latter to reconcile the two points of view but himself serving his patient only.
There is one final moral question that needs to be examined in a lecture with my title: that is, the morality of research. The introduction of ethical committees (surely nearly a contradiction in terms) has taken away the individual responsibility of the medical research worker for deciding what is legitimate in this field, and I believe that this has been detrimental both to research and to its subjects. Exhibiting that tendency to split things into good and bad elements first pointed out to us by Melanie Klein, we now have an autonomy between 'experimentation" thought of as a kind of human vivisection, perhaps the hobby of Mr Hyde, and 'research', a laudable full-time activity leading to breaks-through in knowledge and especially treatment. In fact the one is dependent on the other; and it could be maintained that good research based on well designed and therefore economical experiment is doubly moral in that its success depends on the integrity of the scientist concerned and that without it the physician would at best be an empiricist and at worst a mountebank. All our resources as physicians are derived from previous research; and who is to say that we should stop now, for unless he acts within a coherent universe of expanding knowledge, the physician will be without proper stock-in-trade. Difficulties arise when the patient who could be used as an important source of knowledge is unlikely himself to be able to benefit from its application. If he is an adult the situation can usually be explained to him in such a way that he can give his free consent (and it should not be forgotten that many of us benefit from acting altruistically); but in others and particularly in the case of children, to do so may alarm the patient, make it impossible to gain from him the knowledge that is sought even if he does consent, and unnecessarily jeopardizes the trusting relationship that ought to obtain between physician and patient or client. In law, and rightly so, parents cannot offer their children as experimental subjects, though they should protect them from being improperly made use of, and there is nothing left for it but for the physician to go ahead or hold back on his own moral recognizances, bearing in mind what the child may, when grown up, come to feel would have been the right way for his doctor to proceed, and knowing that the latter is accountable to his peers and to the law. That the patient can sue does not mean that he will do so, provided he is not incited by self-interested lawyers; and if he does, that medical defence societies should perhaps cover this liability as they do those relating from lapses in ordinary practice. Indeed, all practice should involve an element of research, since every treatment of what is always a unique patient represents an experiment from which the doctor should try to learn what he can; and this may involve enrolling the patient in so-called 'series'. It is ironic that at this time so-called 'patient interest groups' should be on the one hand opposing the carrying out of a trial to determine whether a particular vitamin preparation may be useful in the prophylaxis of neural tube defects (King 1982) and on the other clamouring against the introduction of new drugs in human beings without adequate trial.
Our aim should surely be to know exactly what we are doing, and that means 'finding out' by trials designed to minimize error and to maximize benefit. Perhaps the question will turn out to be one of those whose answers depend on a kind of Copernican revolution in the way they are put, i.e. the question may be not whether we can justify research but whether we can justify not doing research. The onus of proof should always be on those who advocate change, not those who adhere to established practice; and clinical research is now well established practice as it ought to be. The same arguments apply to using-apparently healthy children as a source of normal figures for normative data, as to using sick children as subjects in attempting to understand disease processes or to improve methods of treatment: there must be some proportion between the knowledge to be gained and the interference used to get it.
To what tentative conclusions do these reflections lead us? First, the physician must have the courage of his own professional convictions (which implies that he should know what they are) if he is to continue taking them confidently for granted. Secondly, there is virtue in knowing your job and sticking to your last. It is always a mistake to substitute a moral for a technical judgment: for example, the problem of whether to operate on patients with neural tube defects is mainly resolved by knowing that in most cases such interference does not affect the long-term outcome. Thirdly, one of our most important duties is to communicate adequately with our patients and their parents across the barriers of class, education and belief (and this does not mean thrusting information on them when they are in no position to assimilate it). Fourthly, we should not always expect that in some miraculous way we will be able to find a course of action in a given situation that is wholly good. There is, my father taught me, an economic price in time or money for every moral good and a moral price for every economic good; and if we are not to pay the latter, we need to look to the former as we are now being forced to do in relation to expenditure on the NHS. We should not, as my nanny used to say, ask for more when we have left a lot of good food on our plate. Fifthly, we must recognize the right to consultation of the people who work with us and for us: and this may mean concern about their welfare so that, as Browne again put it, 'they have a competence to perform those good works to which they are inclined by nature'.
Lastly, we should remember always that we belong to a noble profession, which over the years has accumulated a moral bank balance on which we can all draw and a moral modus operandi from which we depart at our peril. Lord Moran once said that the only British honours worth striving for were the Victoria Cross and the Fellowship of the Royal Society, and it is noteworthy that the Royal Army Medical Corps has won more VCs than any other corps and that physicians were prominent among the founding members of the Royal Society. It is an honour to be a physician, as our cultural forebears, both Jews and Greeks, acknowledged; and we are, as Francis Bacon said, 'every man debtors to our profession, so that we ought off duty to endeavour ourselves by way of amends to be a .help and an ornament there unto'. I wish I could hope that by preparing and delivering this lecture I have paid a widow's mite towards the discharge of my debt to those who established by example as well as precept the moral standards which we are expected to live up to in our practice.
